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The very terms used to describe a political arrangement that is neither a confederation nor a single centralized authority often lack clear and agreed upon meanings, as David O’Brien explores in detail in his chapter in this volume.  The confusion that exists today was found also in 1786.  Indeed, much debate in the early days of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia were consumed by attempts to define precisely what was meant by a “federal” system.  Historical examples from Chalemagne to the Helvetian confederation were not helpful, because central governments within them were weaker than that proposed for the new United States of America.  Yet, the power that would reside within the constituent parts was significantly greater than local entities could claim under any centralized arrangement.  Indeed, long after the convention ended, James Madison was writing letters still attempting to explain how the proposed configuration of political power could not aptly be described as either.  “Will you pardon me for pointing out an error of fact into which you have fallen, as others have done, by supposing that the term national applied to the contemplated Government,” Madison began to Andrew Stevenson.  “The term was used, not in contradistinction to a limited, but to a federal government . . . .    And there being no technical or appropriate denomination applicable to the new and unique system, the term national was used, with a confidence that it would be not be taken in a wrong sense . . . .”  (Farrand, 1966: III, 473).    In another letter, written to N.P. Trist in 1831, Madison may have touched upon the most distinguishing element of the new design.  He first argued that “national” was not chosen because it implied that all powers were consolidated in a central government, but added that the new arrangement should also not be confused with a confederation of the kind that preceded the constitution of 1787.  The crucial distinguishing feature was that “the powers to be vested in the new Govt. were to operate as in a Natl. Govt. directly on the people and not as in the Old Confedcy. on the States only” (Farrand, 1966: III, 517).
In Europe in the nineteenth century, political will was toward national systems, wherein power was consolidated centrally, and only the Swiss confederation of 1848 deviated from that tendency. Though national governments in Europe were the norm, federal ideas were prevalent in the early years of the twentieth century, particularly between the wars.  Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli were, during the 1940s and 1950s, clearly influenced by federalist ideas, and their inclination is evident in the treaties that founded the EU (Close, 2000: 45).




The sagas of judicial intervention are by now well-known by students of U.S. constitutional development and those of European integration, but usually one, not both, of those stories is told.  This paper links the two in order to discern both familiar patterns and divergent tendencies in the forces driving each judicial expansion and contraction.  
Federalism and Integration




The term “federalism” is nowhere to be found in the U.S. Constitution, but rather it is derived from a juxtaposition of the enumeration of national powers in Articles I, II and III with the reserved powers of Amendment X and moderated by the supremacy clause of Article VI.  The last of those provisions makes explicit that the national constitution and laws trump any other: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of an State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  In light of state rivalries and jealousies to preserve powers at the time of union, the inclusion of that statement is striking, but subsequent history has proved that it was essential to the future of the polity.   The ratification process clarified that the goal of the system should be attainment of an equilibrium between the states and the national government, with some powers exercised concurrently and with a division of sovereignty between states and the national government (Federalist No. 32).
A declaration parallel to the U.S. supremacy clause was included in the draft EU Constitutional Treaty.  Article 10 states that “the Constitution and law adopted by the Union’s Institutions in exercising competences conferred on it, shall have primacy over the law of the Member States.”  The following section instructs all Member states to take “all appropriate measures . . . to ensure fulfillment of the obligations flowing from the constitution or resulting from the Union Institutions’ acts.”








On both sides of the Atlantic, the process of integration proceeded at different rates at over time. The meaning of American federalism was not settled with constitutional ratification (O’Brien, 1997: 595), and the EU’s evolution has proved to be even more fluid as each new treaty attempts to remedy perceived flaws of earlier ones and accommodate new or anticipated conditions.  The recent European Constitutional Treaty attempted a clarification, by instituting, in Article 5 the principle of “loyal cooperation,” which requires that the Union and the Member States “shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Constitution.” There were, even absent the new EU Constitution’s prescription, clear similarities at least in the judicial blush that has colored each version of federation.  The U.S. experience spans more than two centuries and the European one is only one-quarter that, but analogous tendencies, particularly within the high courts, are discernible in the directions and degrees of federalization.
Foundational Era




The Supreme Court decided a series of cases in the early nineteenth century that formed the foundation for a strong central government thereafter.  Marbury v. Madison (1803), McColloch v. Maryland (1819) and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) constituted the three legs on which the U.S. national government could rest its authority.  The first firmly established the supremacy of the Supreme Court and articulated the power of judicial review; the second declared the supremacy of the national constitution and national laws, when appropriately enacted, over those of the states; and the third elaborated a comprehensive definition of commerce as “commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that commerce,” and claimed, thereby,  a far-reaching power for the national Congress to control economic transactions among the states and with foreign nations.  This trilogy of cases declared the supremacy of the national government, so long as it acted within its proper sphere, over that of the states.




In a parallel to McCulloch v. Maryland, the ECJ also declared the supremacy of supranational law in Costa v. E.N.E.L.  The Court explained that, consistent with the spirit of the treaties, Member States had through the treaties accepted “a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights” and thereby Community laws “take precedence in, the legal order applicable in the territory of each of the Member States [and] also preclude the valid adoption of new national legislative measures to the extent to which they would be incompatible with Community provisions” (Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964).  The Court established, thereby, a ground for judicial review of domestic laws by national courts and in the 1977 Simmenthal case the power of judicial review and the supremacy of the treaties was also extended to national constitutions (Dehousse, 1998: 43).
The U.S. case of Gibbons v. Ogden carved out what Europeans call the “positive commerce clause by declaring the authority of the central government to have sole authority to make regulations for interstate commerce.  The ERTA Case (Commission v. Council, 1971) accomplished the same result in Europe be declaring that “when such common rules come into being, the Community alone” can act.  If there is positive commercial integration, then there remains the question of a “negative” commerce clause or integration.  In Europe, prohibitions on negatively affecting the free movement of goods derive from several treaty articles and proscribe tariffs, duties, discriminatory taxes and other barriers to intra-community/union trade.









The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, passed in 1890 under the guise of the commerce clause, was designed to break up collusive or monopolistic concentrations.  The Supreme Court read the commerce clause in the E.C. Knight case (1895) as incapable of extending congressional power to regulate to manufacturing, mining, agriculture or any form of production, activities that were said to precede commerce.  The Court similarly prevented Congress from using the commerce clause to establish “unreasonable” regulations (Standard Oil v. U.S., 1911 and U.S. v. American Tobacco, 1911) or to prohibit products manufactured with the use of child labor from entering interstate commerce (Hammer v. Dagenhart, 1918).  While the U.S. Supreme Court was narrowly defining the national government’s power to regulate commercial enterprises through the commerce clause, it was interestingly upholding use of the commerce clause to promote social policies.  Central government legislation to prohibit interstate transportation of lottery tickets (Champion v. Ames, 1903), stolen automobiles (Brooks v. U.S., 1925), impure good and drugs (Hippolite Egg Co. V. U.S., 1911) and women for immoral purposes (Hoke v. U.S., 1913) were, during the same period, validated by the Supreme Court as legitimate applications of the commerce clause.  The Supreme Court’s treatment of national and state relations during the era of dual federalism was, in other words, not wholly unidirectional.  Only when laissez faire economic theories were offended by national interference did the Court rebuke the central government.




The U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of centralized authority over commerce then mutated again and redefined central and state competencies. Leaving the earlier restrictive interpretation behind, the Court  broadly enunciated the extent of national government authority, under the commerce clause from 1937 until the mid-1990s. Beginning with the decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel (1937), the Court for almost sixty years  rarely encountered an assertion of a congressional power to regulate via the commerce clause that was not constitutional. Though the issue in Jones & Laughlin revolved around manufacturing, the Court found that Congress was within its authority to regulate it; manufacturing was no longer an antecedent to commerce, but part of it. Shortly thereafter, the Court also upheld an application of the commerce clause to establish a minimum wage (U.S. v. Darby, 1941) and explicitly over-ruled its earlier decision in Hammer v.Daggenhart.  By 1942, the Court was willing to uphold the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s application of agricultural quotas to products that were intended for use on the farmer’s own property because “home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce” (Wickard v. Filburn, 1942).




The second phase defining center-periphery relations in Europe commenced in 1973 and ran until 1992.  The European Court of Justice was no longer making revolutionary changes in how member states related to the supranational structure, but rather clarifying, usually to the benefit of the higher authority, what the relationship would be.  A look at how the four freedoms--free movement of persons, good, services and capital-- were implemented in this time period illustrates the trend.  




Free movement of people was rendered less encumbered by national restrictions by the 1975 case of Van Duyn v. Home Office, in which the U.K. refused entrance to a Dutch national who desired to immigrate to Britain to assume employment with a sect that the British government did not approve.  The Court stated that a member state government has no discretion in implementing any Community law, and established the principle of direct effect.  At the same time the ECJ  allowed that the British government could bar Ms. Van Duyn from entering on grounds of public policy.  The stricture against discrimination against non-nationals was held the next year to extend to organizations that were not governmental (Dona v. Mantero, 1976), so long as the reasons were economic in nature.





Weiler sees 1992 and the implementation of the Single Europe Act as heralding the most recent phase of development in the EU, though much of the activity was focused away from the ECJ (Weiler, 1999: 63).  The U.S. Supreme Court in that same decade assumed a different tact in defining national and state competencies.  Both the ECJ and the U.S. Supreme Court began to focus on state sovereign immunity.  Weiler chose his demarcating year because in February, 1992, the Maastrich Treaty or Treaty of European Union (TEU) was signed; its stated intent was to move to closer union. The treaty created two new “pillars”or  mechanisms for implementing common policies on foreign and security and on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.   Both new pillars were explicitly intergovernmental, as opposed to supranational, and both were explicitly placed beyond the purview of the ECJ.  That was slightly modified to give the ECJ limited jurisdiction in police and criminal cooperation by the Amsterdam Treaty that went into effect in 1999.    




Beginning in 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court was also hearing cases involving sovereign immunity for American states, but moving in the opposite direction from its counterpart in Europe.  The first decision involving federalism in the United States was that of Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) and Amendment XI was passed to counter it, preventing national courts from entertaining law suits against a state.  In other words, the amendment guaranteed that a state cannot be sued without its consent. In the 1999 case of Alden v. Maine the U.S. Supreme Court held that state employees could not, under Amendment XI, sue their employing states under the national Fair Labor Standards Act.  The Court in 2000 similarly found that the U.S. Age Discrimination in Employment Act could not be applied to state governments, since Congress could not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity (Kimel v. Florida, 2000) and the next year that the Americans with Disabilities Act fell, with reference to state employees, to the same fate (Alabama v.Garrett, 2001).  In short, Amendment XI was erected as a barrier to applying otherwise valid national legislation to state governments.  An exception to that rule was carved out in 2003, when the Court held that a state employee could sue the state for violating the Family Leave Act, because Congress did possess the power under Amendment XIV’s equal protection clause to remedy gender discrimination.  The equal protection clause, in effect, trumped state sovereign immunity (Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 2003).

The Supreme Court also began to contract national reach under the commerce clause.  Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) was mentioned earlier as having extended congressional authority under the commerce clause. Though Garcia has never been explicitly over-ruled, the Court has limited the the extent of congressional application of the commerce clause in recent years.  In New York v. U.S. (1992) the Low-Level Radioactive Water Policy Act of 1980 was deemed an infringement on state authority as protected by Amendment X.  The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act required state law enforcement agencies to conduct criminal background checks on people wanting to buy guns, but the Supreme Court held, in Printz v. U.S. and Mack v. U.S. (1997), that the federal government could not “command” that state officials to enforce a national regulatory mechanism.  Notably, use of state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks was only an interim measure until a national system was operational, and the advent of a national system almost coincided with Court’s decision in 1997.  





To understand what all of this says about the nature of federalism in the U.S. and the EU and where each many be going, the nature of how and why judges made the decisions they did seems central.  That can best be approached by returning to Gibson’s three-pronged explanation for how judges decide cases: judicial preferences, legal policy constraints and external limitations (1983: 9).  Judicial preferences usually connote ideological, political or policy predispositions that will color how a judge will view the law to be interpreted or applied.  These values or goals are usually relatively consistent over time for each judge (Segal and Spaeth, 1993).  During the foundational period on both sides of the Atlantic, the judges were motivated, it is generally agreed, by specific goals.  Both sets of judges were federalists and, in the case of the United States, Federalist partisans.  The Marshall Court (1801-1836) defined the foundational era and consciously intended to create “an effective national government endowed with vital substantive powers” (Schwartz, 1993: 45).  The judges on the ECJ were driven by market-building (Weiner, 2000: 320).    Moreover, during their foundational periods, both courts were largely unencumbered by prior decisions and jurisprudence that might have limited their work; both were quite clearly writing on blank slates and painting the first judicial blushes on constitutional and treaty provisions.




The era of mutation of competencies was, for the ECJ, an easier time.  The Court was primarily putting muscle on a skeletal architecture that was already in place.  European integration was, as a whole, largely stagnant during these years (Weiler, 1999: 39).  The Court encountered little resistence from other European institutions and was gaining support at the national level from domestic judges (Alter, 1997).




The two courts diverge, though, in the third cycle of their development of federalism.  The ECJ was rebuked, if only mildly, by provisions of the Maastrich Treaty that explicitly denied the Court a hand in new initiatives.  Before concluding, however, that the ECJ was clinging to an isolated position when it encroached on national sovereignty and asserted that member states could be held financially liable for violations of EU law, another feature of the Maastrich treaty should be noted.  Because of repeated difficulties in gaining member state compliance, the Commission was given the option to impose penalties when states refused to comply with decisions of the ECJ.  The Commission first used this option in 1997, when it sought a financial penalty against a member nation sanctioned by the ECJ (Azzi, 2000: 64).  The Court was, perhaps, acting in concert with the EU executive in assuring that supranational laws were not flaunted by recalcitrant states.  At the very least, the two sought the same goal.
Ideology is the most obvious explanation for the U.S. Supreme Court’s shift on some extensions of the commerce clause and on its position on state sovereign immunity.  Chief Justice William Rehnquist has long championed states’ rights, but won only once, in the 1976 National League of Cities v. Usery that was subsequently overturned.  His position gained support on the bench with the arrival of the first conservative majority since 1936.  That majority reflects the conservative movement in the U.S. prior to the 1992 election, and it has made a “definite changes in direction” in several lines of jurisprudence.  All tilt to the right (Schwartz, 1993: 372).  There has been no tension between the Court and other institutions as a result of the federalism decisions, largely because lawmakers, politicians and the public are not particularly interested in the subject.  Federalism struck a chord in the U.S. during the drive for racial integration in the 1950s and 1960s, but no longer garners votes or exacts tolls.  




What, though, has determined the directions of the courts?  Preferences or ideologies have been determinative in three eras in the U.S., but a reaction followed the foundational period, the 1895-1936 free market bent and, most recently, the very central government friendly interpretation of the commerce clause.  The reactions to the first and the last came through changes in Court personnel; the 1937 shift was in response to a number of external political pressures.  None can be attributed to strictly legal concerns.
On the European side of the equation, the direction of the Court has not altered significantly.  Once the foundational period constitutionalized the treaties and began a centralizing course, that trajectory has been generally maintained.  The intensity of the pace has varied, however, over time.  Since judicial votes are not recorded on the ECJ, attributing values or ideology at the individual judge level is impossible.  At the level of the Court, however, market building and integration seem to be the overlying templates across three eras.  That has been possible because of the consistent complicity of the Commission, the Council and member state judges.
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